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ELEPHANTS AND MICE REVISITED:  LAW AND
CHOICE OF LAW ON THE INTERNET
PETER P. SWIRE†
By definition, an essential question of cyberlaw is to define when
law will affect actions in cyberspace.  Such law might be uniform, such
as where nations have entered into a treaty or have adopted the same
legal rule.  Or, such law might be diverse, such as where nations adopt
different legal rules.
Diversity of law often does not matter for physical acts, such as
where the criminal law of one country simply does not apply to acts
performed in a foreign country.  On the Internet, however, diversity
of law poses a fundamental challenge.  Each surfer on a website might
be from a foreign jurisdiction, with laws unknown to the owner of the
site.  Similarly, each website visited by a surfer might be hosted in a
foreign jurisdiction, with laws unknown to the surfer.  Every encoun-
ter in cyberspace, therefore, raises the possibility that diverse laws will
apply.  The rules for choosing among diverse laws—the subject of this
part of the Symposium on “Choice of Law and Jurisdiction on the
Internet”—thus appear uniquely important for cyberspace.
Surprisingly, however, the number of actual cases addressing
choice of law on the Internet is far, far lower than the initial analysis
would suggest.  Although there is the possibility of diverse national laws
in every Internet encounter, some mysterious mechanisms are reduc-
ing the actual conflicts to a handful of cases.
This Article seeks to explain those mysterious mechanisms.  It
does not primarily address the prescriptive task of saying what the op-
timal rules should be for resolving conflicting national laws that affect
the Internet.  Instead, it takes on a descriptive task.  It treats choice of
law on the Internet as a dependent variable; the task is to explain
when and how choice-of-law rules actually matter on the Internet.
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That choice-of-law question, in turn, overlaps considerably with the
even broader question—when and how does any rule of law actually
matter on the Internet?
In order to deepen our understanding of the effects of legal rules
generally and of choice-of-law rules in particular, this Article compares
current Internet legal issues with the list of issues described in my
1998 article, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy:  International Choice of Law
and the Internet.1  The historical comparison shows that most of the
current choice-of-law topics were already identified in the earlier pe-
riod.  The chief exception concerns cybercrime and related com-
puter security topics, which were only dimly seen on the horizon in
1998.
The discussion then turns to the mysterious mechanisms that have
reduced the possibility of incessant choice-of-law disputes down to the
actual handful of cases.  Four significant filters exist before a court
must choose among conflicting national laws:  technology’s ability to
trump law; lack of jurisdiction over defendants; the harmonization of
diverse laws; and the existence of self-regulatory and other systems
that suppress choice-of-law conflicts for transactions.  For a core con-
cern of the earlier article—business sales to consumers over the Inter-
net2—this last filter has proven decisive in avoiding choice-of-law con-
flicts.
Only a small subset of disputes makes it through all four filters.
For those that do, this Article offers a new typology for the categories
of residual disputes.  First, harms can occur to third parties who are
not bound by contracts between surfers and websites.  Those harms
can happen to owners of intellectual property, where laws have not
been harmonized.  They can also happen in tort, most prominently
for the tort of defamation.  Second, conflicts can occur for a limited
number of issues involving significant moral, political, or constitu-
tional differences among nations.  To date, the most prominent dis-
putes have involved speech protected by the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.  In the future, we can expect occasional, albeit im-
portant, court decisions that seek to choose among national laws in
the event of diverse laws.
1
Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy:  International Choice of Law and the
Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991 (1998).
2
See id. at 1016-17 (relating the importance of the Internet to international busi-
ness and consumer sales).
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I.  THE TOPICS OF INTERNET LAW
Many of the major current topics of Internet law, which can lead
to international choice-of-law disputes, were identified in the 1998 ar-
ticle.3  A variety of consumer-protection and other issues can arise as
individuals surf on foreign web pages or buy from foreign sites.  Intel-
lectual property disputes are manifest, notably for copyrights and
trademarks.  Privacy and data protection issues exist, such as when
protective rules in Europe are not matched by laws in the United
States and other countries.  Content that is objectionable in some ju-
risdictions is legal in others.  Notable examples include hate speech,
pornography, and treasonable or politically censored speech.  On the
Internet, where everyone can be a publisher, digital defamation can
easily occur.
In 1998, it was also possible to identify the types of business issues
that would be troublesome on the Internet and potentially raise
choice-of-law issues.  Taxation becomes more complex as commerce
shifts to the Net and away from identified import/export companies.
Countries vary in their acceptance of gambling and other business ac-
tivities.  Looking ahead, in a world of outsourcing and offshoring,
there will likely be increasing issues concerning professional licensing
and the application of local labor laws to Internet activities.
Strikingly, the 1998 list missed a dark side of international Inter-
net behavior.  Even for those of us immersed in researching the
Internet, there was little or no attention paid to the importance of
computer security and cybercrime, much less to the potential use of
the Internet for terrorist activity.4  Since 1998, the Internet commu-
3
See id. at 1017-19 (describing eleven areas where choice-of-law issues might arise
on the Internet).
4
The 1998 article was written after over two hundred interviews conducted for
PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:  WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998).
There were, of course, experts involved in Internet security and cybercrime by the
time of the 1998 article.  The point here, which is striking in retrospect, is the very low
level of awareness of those issues at the time even among Internet experts.  A presenta-
tion on the National Cybercrime Training Partnership (NCTP) by a lawyer for the U.S.
Department of Justice Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section gives a sense of
the initial phases of national and international awareness of cybercrime as of January
1999.  See WAYNE P. WILLIAMS, NCTP VISION, MISSION, AND STRATEGY 13 (1999) (show-
ing very early steps taken to address U.S. and international cybercrime from 1994 to
1998), available at http://www.wjin.net/Pubs/2476.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).  My
own education on these topics was accelerated during my time in government, when I
participated in activities such as:  the drafting of an interagency report on unlawful
conduct on the Internet, THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
1978 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1975
nity has become far more aware of crime and security-related issues,
which often occur across national borders.  These issues include com-
puter hacking, diffusion of computer viruses, identity theft, phishing,5
and spyware.  Another related topic that has expanded in importance
concerns a different sort of unwanted intrusion into a user’s com-
puter, through spam.
In short, the Internet makes it easy and inexpensive for an actor in
one country to affect another country.  The number of potential
transborder legal disputes, which contain choice-of-law issues, seems
enormous.
II. DOES TECHNOLOGY TRUMP LAW?
THE METAPHOR OF
ELEPHANTS AND MICE
As discussed in the 1998 article,6 the hope and belief of many
Internet pioneers was that geography would prove “a virtually mean-
ingless construct on the Internet.”7  In that early era, there were brave
declarations that “the Internet treats censorship as damage, and
routes around it,” or “national borders aren’t even speedbumps on
the Information Highway.”8  For these Internet pioneers, the vision
was that technology would trump law.
The 1998 article introduced the metaphor of elephants and mice
to explain when that vision was provably false or else substantially held
true.9  In short, “elephants” are organizations that will be subject to
ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER:  THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); working on computer
security issues for federal agency systems; and working in late 2000 on discussions con-
cerning the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Convention on Cybercrime,
opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-11 (2003), Europ. T.S. No.
185, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/185.doc.
5
Phishing refers to the use of scam e-mails to acquire an individual’s private in-
formation for identity theft.  Webopedia Computer Dictionary, Phishing, at http://
www.webopedia.com/Term/p/phishing.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2005).
6
See Swire, supra note 1, at 991-92 (describing the shift from a romantic to a legal-
istic attitude toward the Internet).
7
Id. at 991 (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)).
8
Id. at 991-92 (quoting Posting of Timothy C. May to owner-cypherpunks@toad.com
(Feb. 13, 1997) and Posting of John Young to owner-cypherpunks@toad.com (Apr. 5,
1998)).
9
See id. at 1019-22 for an explanation of the metaphor of elephants and mice and
how legal rules affect each.
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the law, while “mice” can hope to ignore it.  Elephants are large com-
panies or other organizations that have major operations in a country.
Elephants are powerful and have a thick skin, but are impossible to
hide.  They are undoubtedly subject to a country’s jurisdiction.  Once
laws are enacted, they likely will have to comply.  By contrast, mice are
small and mobile actors, such as pornography sites or copyright viola-
tors, who can reopen immediately after being kicked off of a server or
can move offshore.  Mice breed annoyingly quickly—new sites can
open at any time.  Where harm over the Internet is caused by mice,
hidden in crannies in the network, traditional legal enforcement is
more difficult.
Applied to choice of law, the earlier article explained how the
metaphor of elephants and mice suggests where international choice-
of-law rules are most likely to be important:
Elephants are often subject to jurisdiction in multiple countries.  When
disputes arise, the issue quickly becomes which sovereign’s rules will ap-
ply—the classic choice of law question.  As international sales to con-
sumers become more prominent, choice of law disputes will often arise
between the seller’s country and the individual’s national consumer pro-
tection law.  On the other hand, the legal regulation of mice will more
rarely implicate choice of law issues.  The mice will disguise their iden-
tity, dispute jurisdiction, and hide their assets from judgment.  Only
rarely will they emerge into the light of open court to assert a defense
based on choice of law.
10
The activities of mice, I believe, were what the early Internet pio-
neers were implicitly assuming when they claimed that national laws
would have little effect on cyberspace.  There are two key features to
violations of law caused by mice—it is hard to stop one mouse, and
there is rarely only one mouse.  Think about the difficulty in tracking
one virus writer or one person who illegally distributes copyrighted
songs and pictures over the Internet.  Next, think about how much
more difficult it is to try to stop all virus writers or all those who ille-
gally distribute copyrighted material.
There are strategies in the physical world for catching mice and
stopping them (or at least most of them) from getting at the food in
the pantry.  Analogous strategies exist for the virtual world, and are
discussed further in the Conclusion.  Where those strategies are not in
place, however, mice will often be able to evade the effects of law.
Current examples include:  hackers who attack systems remotely; virus
writers; sites that show content that is illegal locally (such as pornog-
10
Id. at 1025.
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raphy, hate speech, or speech otherwise censored by the local re-
gime); Internet scams, including phishing; and illegal copying of
copyrighted songs, photos, and other material.  One current example
that is causing particular problems for the Internet is the flood of un-
authorized commercial e-mail, or spam.  The (perhaps rabid) mice
who send spam go to great lengths to stay hidden, and often operate
offshore to make tracing and enforcement more difficult.11
By contrast, elephants have to be much more mindful of the law.
They may use their bulk and strength to lobby and otherwise help
shape the law.  Elephants also have thick hides, as they deploy legal
counsel, public relations agencies, and other means to defend them-
selves in court and otherwise to discourage regulatory actions.  When
a serious legal regime exists, however, elephants will find it expensive
to ignore it.  For instance, a large company will have to pay large pen-
alties if it violates copyright law on its website.  For privacy, compa-
nies with large databases, such as credit card companies and airline
reservation systems, will not escape the regulators’ notice.  In gen-
eral, it will be difficult to ignore a local sovereign if the elephant has
employees and assets in that jurisdiction.  In these instances, tech-
nology will not trump law, even when activities are conducted via the
Internet.  Where multiple countries have jurisdiction over an ele-
phant, then choice-of-law rules can indeed dictate the outcome of a
dispute.
11
According to then-Federal Trade Commission Chairman Timothy J. Muris:
Even with incredibly painstaking, expensive, and time-consuming investiga-
tion, it is often impossible to determine where spam originates.  Spammers
are extremely adroit at concealing the paths that their messages travel to get
to recipients’ in-boxes.  Typically, the most that can be ascertained with cer-
tainty is the last computer through which the spam traversed immediately be-
fore arriving at its final destination.  To frustrate law enforcers, clever spam-
mers may arrange for this penultimate computer to be outside the country
where the spam’s ultimate recipient is located.
Timothy J. Muris, FTC, Unsolicited Commercial Email, Prepared Statement Before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (May 20, 2004), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/040520spamemailtest.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2005).  Chairman Muris also commented specifically on “spammers’ willingness to ignore
the law.”  Id.  A spammer’s willingness to ignore the law in general reinforces the conclu-
sion that choice-of-law rules in particular will have little relevance to deterring spammers.
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III.  IS THERE JURISDICTION?
Where technology does not provide immunity, potential defen-
dants can hope that jurisdiction does not apply.  Courts who lack ju-
risdiction—literally, the ability to “say the law”—never get to the sub-
sequent topic of choosing which law to apply.  A possible explanation
for the paucity of conflicts cases, therefore, would be if jurisdiction is
lacking for Internet activities.
That explanation, however, does not work well.  At least for com-
mercial actors who use the Internet to sell into another country, there
will very often be jurisdiction both in the country of the seller and the
buyer.  The country of the seller will typically be a place of business,
with “continuous and systematic” contacts, so the seller’s country will
have general jurisdiction.12  Controversy has centered on when there is
also jurisdiction in the country of the surfer or buyer.  The United
States has been more hesitant to find such jurisdiction than have
European countries.
Even under U.S. law as it has developed, however, typical com-
mercial activities on the Internet are sufficient to create jurisdiction in
the state or nation of the buyer.  The early Internet cases often used
the so-called Zippo test, which found jurisdiction for “interactive” web-
sites but not for “passive” ones.13  Over time, the position of U.S.
courts has evolved.  Jurisdiction scholar Allan Stein sums up the cur-
rent state of the law:  “[T]here must be evidence that the defendant
‘purposefully availed’ itself of conducting activity in the forum state,
by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting
with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through sufficient
other related contacts.”14  In the European Union, the revisions to the
Brussels Convention have clarified the law for business-to-consumer
transactions over the Internet:  jurisdiction will generally exist in the
buyer’s country, and judgments from that country will generally be
enforced in other European countries.15
12
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
13
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (“A passive Web site . . . is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdic-
tion.”).
14
Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Seeing Due Process Through the
Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 432 (2004) (quoting Toys “R” Us,
Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003)).
15
Council Regulation 44/2001, arts. 5, 38, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4, 11.  For a discus-
sion of the revisions to the Brussels Convention, see Cindy Chen, Comment, United
States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction and Their Impact on E-
Commerce, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 423 (2004).
1982 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1975
These legal rules make it quite likely that Internet vendors will be
subject to jurisdiction in the country of the buyer.  A leader in the
American Bar Association working on this topic expressed the result-
ing concern:  “Businesses may forgo the efficiency and accessibility of
electronic commerce if faced with the ‘litigious nightmare’ of being
subject to suit in every jurisdiction on the globe.”16  In response, there
are some steps that e-commerce companies are taking to reduce the
risk of being haled into court in some distant and perhaps unknown
jurisdiction.  A useful study led by Professor Michael Geist found:
Some companies, particularly those situated in North America, seek to
influence jurisdictional outcomes by using both technological and legal
approaches to mitigate risk.  The most common methods to achieve this
include the insertion of legal terms on websites, the use of a local server,
the use of a national (country-code) top domain name, or the posting of
local content.
17
The use of a local server, a local domain name, and local content all
would help prove that only the local market was being targeted for
business by that website.  Such strategies might help convince a court
that the site is not meeting the U.S. test for “purposely availing” itself
of other markets.  It is far less clear, however, that such strategies
would create a defense against jurisdiction under the law of the Euro-
pean Union or other nations that follow the country of destination
approach.
Perhaps these strategies, however, serve as practical rather than
legal defenses against lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions.  There is evi-
dence from the Geist survey that supports this view.  For companies
that adjusted their business operations in response to Internet juris-
diction risk, as many targeted lower-risk jurisdictions as sought to re-
duce activity in higher-risk jurisdictions.18  Targeting lower-risk juris-
dictions does not create a legal barrier to other buyers.  It does,
however, reduce the practical likelihood of suit in unexpected coun-
tries.  As discussed further below,19 the transaction patterns that sur-
16
Thomas P. Vartanian, A U.S. Perspective on the Global Jurisdictional Checkpoints in
Cyberspace (1999), available at http://www.ilpf.org/events/jurisdiction/presentations/
vartanianpr.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
17
MICHAEL GEIST, INTERNET JURISDICTION SUB-COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N,
GLOBAL INTERNET JURISDICTION:  THE ABA/ICC SURVEY 3 (2004), available at
http://www.mgblog.com/resc/Global%20Internet%20Survey.pdf.
18
See id. at 14 (noting that roughly twelve percent of companies surveyed were in
each category).
19
See infra Part V.
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vive on the Internet seem to be those that reduce the risk of jurisdic-
tional and choice-of-law disputes.
For the elephants of Internet commerce, then, jurisdiction will
rarely be a successful defense.  Noncommercial activities, which merely
announce information through a website, have a stronger likelihood of
a successful defense to jurisdiction, under the U.S. if not the European
approach.  For the mice, their strategy of hiding entirely will often be
more effective than denying jurisdiction.  If they create significant harms
in another jurisdiction, then the courts of that nation are likely to strive
mightily to find a way to state the law.
IV.  IS THERE HARMONIZATION AS A MATTER OF LAW?
If technology does not trump law, and there is jurisdiction, then
there may be no conflicts among national laws due to harmonization
of the applicable legal rules.  Scholars including Colin Bennett20 and
Justin Hughes21 have emphasized how convergence of legal rules, or in
some instances complete harmonization, is the central way that na-
tions have avoided conflicts on data protection, intellectual property,
and other cyberlaw areas.
In partial disagreement with Professors Bennett and Hughes, my
own view is that formal adoption of harmonized legal rules has not
been especially widespread for the troublesome topics of cyberlaw.
Professor Hughes, who participated in World Intellectual Property
Organization negotiations, has correctly highlighted the effectiveness
of WIPO in harmonizing important parts of copyright and other intel-
lectual property law.  Professor Bennett, a data protection expert, has
correctly described privacy harmonization that developed for some
countries, notably for members of the European Union under the
Data Protection Directive.  With that said, formal, multinational insti-
tutions designed to harmonize law have not been largely successful for
cyberlaw topics.  Professor Hughes himself admits that the set of issues
protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is a major
exception to his otherwise optimistic view of convergence of legal sys-
tems.22  This Article will briefly examine four topics of proposed har-
monization, in roughly descending order of the success at getting
global agreement:  cybercrime, data protection, enforcement of con-
20
COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY:  DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992).
21
Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2003).
22
Id. at 391-93.
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sumer-protection laws, and jurisdiction and enforcement of judg-
ments.
A.  The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention
There has been one prominent harmonization effort in the area
of Internet-related criminal law.  The Council of Europe Cybercrime
Convention was signed by over thirty countries, including the United
States, in 2001.23  As stated by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Con-
vention is:
[T]he first multilateral agreement drafted specifically to address the
problems posed by the international nature of computer crime. . . . (1)
requiring signatory countries to establish certain substantive offenses in
the area of computer crime, (2) requiring Parties to adopt domestic
procedural laws to investigate computer crimes, and (3) providing a
solid basis for international law enforcement cooperation in combating
crime committed through computer systems.
24
The Convention has come under sharp attack, often justifiably, on
a number of fronts.25  Notably, the Convention calls for increased sur-
veillance powers with no similarly detailed standards to protect privacy
and limit governmental use of such powers.  With that said, my view is
that it is important to adapt law enforcement investigations to the re-
ality that many cybercrimes involve communications that pass through
multiple countries.  The Convention seeks to harmonize domestic
definitions of cybercrime, so that similar behavior is considered
23
For the text and commentary of the Convention, see Convention on Cyber-
crime, supra note 4.  Signatories are listed on the Council of Europe’s website, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG
(last visited Mar. 21, 2005).  Ten additional countries have signed on since November
2001.  Id.
24
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:  COUNCIL
OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm (last modified Nov. 10, 2003).
25
I agree with many of the points in CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., COMMENTS
OF THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY ON THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE DRAFT
“CONVENTION ON CYBER-CRIME” (DRAFT NO. 25) (2001), at http://www.cdt.org/
international/cybercrime/010206cdt.shtml (critiquing the expansive reach of the
Convention, with the potential for violations of privacy).  For an extensive history and
critique of the Convention, see YAMAN AKDENIZ, AN ADVOCACY HANDBOOK FOR THE
NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS:  THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S CYBER-CRIME
CONVENTION 2001 AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ACTS
OF A RACIST OR XENOPHOBIC NATURE COMMITTED THROUGH COMPUTER SYSTEMS (rev.
ed. 2004), at http://www.cyber-rights.org/cybercrime/coe_handbook_crcl.pdf.
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criminal.26  It also aims to achieve fast and effective international co-
operation to investigate and deter cybercrime.27  As has been seen in
some major computer attacks to date, the absence of international
agreement on these topics has permitted clearly criminal behavior to
go unpunished.28
Despite these goals of harmonizing cybercrime law and proce-
dures for pursuing joint investigations, only nine countries had rati-
fied the Convention as of the time of this writing.29  It is doubtful that
sanctions will be enforced against countries that fail to enact conform-
ing substantive law or fail to cooperate in investigations.
B.  Data Protection Harmonization and the Safe Harbor
The 1998 article had an extensive discussion of choice-of-law is-
sues under the European Union Data Protection Directive.30  That dis-
cussion highlighted the potential that E.U. Member States would in-
terpret Article 4 of the Directive broadly, to apply even to websites in
the United States and elsewhere that did not sell any products inside
the E.U.  Although there has been no formal statement by regulators
forswearing that broad reading, actual enforcement has not been
nearly so broad.  Instead, I believe that all of the privacy enforcement
actions by E.U. Member States have been predicated on activity that
took place within the E.U.
One reason for the lack of extraterritorial enforcement (and the
consequent lack of authoritative resolution of choice-of-law issues) has
been the Safe Harbor agreement reached between the United States
and the European Union in 2000.31  The Safe Harbor created a lim-
26
Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 4, arts. 2-13, Europ. T.S. No. 185 at 4-8.
27
For a generally favorable review of the Convention, including analysis of cross-
border remote searches, see Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote
Cross-Border Searches, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 106-07.
28
Cf. ‘Love Bug’ Virus Case Dropped in Philippines; No Legal Grounds for Trial of Stu-
dent, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2000, at A12 (reporting the dismissal of charges against a
defendant because the Philippines did not have a criminal statute covering computer
hacking).
29
See the list of signatories on the Council of Europe’s website, supra note 23, for
their ratification status.
30
See Swire, supra note 1, at 998-1015 (analyzing harmonization under the Direc-
tive).
31
See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commis-
sion, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 45,665-86 (July 24, 2000) (providing the Safe Harbor Princi-
ples and a set of frequently asked questions for consideration by the European Com-
mission); Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided
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ited, but significant, degree of harmonization of privacy standards be-
tween the level required under the E.U. Data Protection Directive and
that provided under U.S. law.  Organizations that subscribe to the
seven Safe Harbor Principles of notice, choice, onward transfer, ac-
cess, security, data integrity, and enforcement are considered to pro-
vide adequate privacy protection and thus may export personal data
from the European Union to the United States.  These seven princi-
ples are not identical to the protections required within the European
Union, but do track the key fair information principles protected un-
der European law.
There has been substantial criticism of the Safe Harbor.  Privacy
supporters have criticized it for not being protective enough of pri-
vacy.32  Detractors have noted the relatively small number of organiza-
tions that have formally enrolled in the Safe Harbor program.33  A lin-
gering concern is that the entire financial services sector, which is
central to transborder data flows, is excluded from the scope of the
Safe Harbor.34
by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued
by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 7-9 (declaring that organiza-
tions that adopt the Safe Harbor Principles provide adequate protection of personal
data for the purposes of the Directive).  See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Welcome
to the Safe Harbor, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last modified Mar. 2, 2005)
(providing complete information and documents on the Safe Harbor).  In my position
as Chief Counselor for Privacy in the Clinton Administration, I was involved in the ne-
gotiations of the Safe Harbor, supporting the efforts of David Aaron and the late Bar-
bara Wellbery.
32
See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 717, 719 (2001) (arguing that the Safe Harbor “is only a weak, seriously flawed
solution for e-commerce”).  For the 2004 review by the European Commission of the
operation of the Safe Harbor, see Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, The Implementa-
tion of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Pro-
vided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
the US Department of Commerce (Comm’n Staff, Working Doc. No. SEC(04)1323, 2004)
[hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document], available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/adequacy/sec-2004-1323_en.pdf (last visited Mar.
21, 2005).
For an analysis of how the E.U. data protection laws have exerted pressure to har-
monize to a stricter level of privacy protection, see Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and
Social Protection:  The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Pri-
vacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 55-88 (2000).
33
The number has grown over time, however, with 401 in November 2003 and
688 as of March 22, 2005, although not all organizations have kept their certifica-
tions current.  Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 32, at 5 (citing the
401 figure).  Current registrants are available at http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/
shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
34
The Safe Harbor applies to organizations under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportation, but not to organiza-
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With that said, my own view is that the Safe Harbor has been fairly
successful at meeting two strategic goals:  avoiding a trans-Atlantic
trade war and providing a reasonable baseline for privacy protection
in transborder activities.  Agreement on the Safe Harbor succeeded
on a political level, allowing the Europeans to point to agreement on
significant privacy protections on data transferred to the United
States, and allowing the United States to point to the relatively man-
ageable compliance costs of the Safe Harbor principles.  Agreement
on the Safe Harbor can also be defended as a “soft” harmonization of
privacy law.35  Both for organizations who have formally enrolled in
the Safe Harbor, and for the larger group of organizations who are
aware of the Safe Harbor, the Safe Harbor principles give a widely
known set of rules for what is considered appropriate corporate ac-
tion.  Even though most companies will never face an enforcement
action or a privacy audit, any organization that deviates substantially
from the Safe Harbor principles runs the risk of exposure and en-
forcement.  The potential number of choice-of-law cases involving
privacy is greatly reduced under this soft version of harmonization
that gives notice to organizations about key, expected privacy protec-
tions.
C. Harmonized Consumer-Protection Enforcement
An even softer form of harmonization is seen with regard to con-
sumer protection for cross-border transactions.  The International
Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICPEN) was
founded in 1992 and now includes the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
and agencies from twenty-eight other countries.36  Much of ICPEN’s
work to date has been to share information about common problems
facing enforcement agencies, and to spread better practices for en-
tions governed by financial regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
For a discussion of the complex jurisdictional and substantive issues that have pre-
vented use of the Safe Harbor for financial institutions, see Kyle Thomas Sammin,
Note, Any Port in a Storm:  The Safe Harbor, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Problem of
Privacy in Financial Services, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 653, 657-71 (2004).
35
See generally Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1872-73 (2002) (defining “soft law” in relation to the traditional
sources of international law, such as treaties and customary international law).
36
Int’l Consumer Prot. & Enforcement Network (ICPEN), About ICPEN, at
http://www.icpen.org/imsn/abouticpen.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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forcement activities.37  To promote consistent international enforce-
ment, member agencies have participated in “sweep days” that target a
specific category of Internet scams in different countries on the same
day.38  In 2000, member agencies issued findings on cross-border
remedies, identifying areas “where the ability of IMSN members col-
lectively to protect consumers and foster consumer confidence is lim-
ited.  Members expect that the growth of e-commerce will make these
limitations increasingly problematic.”39  For the foreseeable future,
harmonization is likely to proceed in the areas of information sharing
and some extension of cross-border remedies, but not through adop-
tion of harmonized substantive law for consumer protection.
D. The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments
A major harmonization effort in the area of jurisdiction and en-
forcement of judgments has thus far stalled.  The proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters was designed, among other things, to set up
harmonized rules for determining which jurisdiction’s laws should
apply to business-to-consumer transactions over the Internet.40  Par-
ticular controversy has accompanied Article 7 of the proposed Con-
vention.  Negotiators have put forward a number of variations that
seek to compromise between the country-of-destination rule (favored
37
Interview with William Kovacic, former General Counsel of the Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 21, 2005).  Another cross-border forum for developing best prac-
tices for consumer issues is the Committee on Consumer Policy of the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development.  Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
Consumer Policy, at  http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34267_1_1_1_
1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
38
See ICPEN, Activities, at http://www.icpen.org/imsn/activities.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2005) (describing sweep days and the success of Sweep Day 2004).
39
INT’L MKTG. SUPERVISION NETWORK (IMSN), FINDINGS ON CROSS-BORDER
REMEDIES, at http://www.icpen.org/imsn/cross%20border%20findings.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2005).  (IMSN is the former name of ICPEN.)
40
There has been considerable writing about the proposed Convention.  For one
recent article that collects sources, see Timothy P. Lester, Globalized Automatic Choice of
Forum:  Where Do Internet Consumers Sue?  Proposed Article 7 of the Hague Convention on In-
ternational Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and Its Possible
Effects on e-Commerce, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 431 (2003).  For a discussion
highlighting controversial aspects of the proposed Convention other than choice of
forum, see Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203 (2001).  The working documents
of the proposed Hague Convention can be accessed at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=4.
2005] LAW AND CHOICE OF LAW ON THE INTERNET 1989
by European countries and consumer advocates) and rules that give
more weight to the seller’s country of origin (favored by the United
States and e-commerce companies).  One area of possible eventual
compromise would be to give country-of-origin treatment to transac-
tions where the seller does not have notice of the location of the
buyer.41  Until this issue is resolved, it appears highly unlikely that
there will be formal harmonization for jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments.
V.  STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS TO AVOID
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS
The three previous filters have given limited protection to ele-
phants against facing choice-of-law disputes:  the ability of technology
to trump law applies primarily to mice; jurisdiction is likely to exist in
both the country of origin and the country of destination for many
consumer transactions; and effective harmonization exists in only a
limited subset of areas of law.  This Part argues that a fourth filter
screens out the bulk of potential disputes—the structuring of online
transactions in ways that avoid choice-of-law problems.
For business-to-business transactions over the Internet, this screen-
ing process is rarely controversial.  Legal regimes, including the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, gener-
ally allow the parties to select by contract which forum’s law will ap-
ply.42
For business-to-consumer transactions, however, the growth of e-
commerce has been influenced by the risks introduced at the begin-
41
See Lester, supra note 40, app. II at 479-89 (providing multiple proposed variants
of Article 7).  At the risk of stepping on a hornet’s nest, my own view is that it likely
makes sense to have country-of-origin treatment for some categories of transactions
where the seller does not have notice of the buyer’s jurisdiction.  In many transactions,
the seller learns the buyer’s delivery address or other information that gives notice of
the buyer’s jurisdiction.  From the seller’s side, much of the perceived jurisdictional
risk of participating in e-commerce would be eliminated if the seller could develop
good information about the buyer’s jurisdiction and then decide whether to do busi-
ness in that jurisdiction.  By reducing the total risk to both sellers and buyers, this ap-
proach is quite possibly the best in terms of encouraging e-commerce.  The sellers can
reduce much of the perceived jurisdictional risk, while ordinary consumers can have
confidence that the transaction will be governed by the familiar law of their home
country.
42
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
done Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1988); see also Swire, supra note 1, at 993-98 (describing relevant EU law
and the Convention’s place within it).
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ning of the Article—the fear by the surfer that the website will impose
unfamiliar laws and the fear by the seller that the buyer comes from a
jurisdiction that imposes unfamiliar laws.  With the breakdown of talks
in the Hague Convention,43 we are likely to continue to have legal un-
certainty about precisely which laws will apply to which sorts of trans-
actions.
The result, I suggest, has been the migration of online transac-
tions to largely unforeseen structures that greatly reduce the risk of
choice-of-law disputes.  I explored three major examples of these
structures in a 2003 article called Trustwrap:  The Importance of Legal
Rules to Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy.44  That article described
three early beliefs about how commerce would take place on the
Internet.45  First, payments would be made with new e-cash systems.
Second, new “pure play” Internet retailers would defeat the stodgy
companies that had physical stores.  Third, using the wonderful power
of search engines, buyers and sellers would interact directly and with-
out the need for intermediaries.
Each of these predictions has turned out to be wrong, and in ways
that greatly reduce the number of choice-of-law disputes.  Merchants
have learned to build “trustwrap” into each transaction—to find ways
to demonstrate to consumers that an online purchase is safe.  First, e-
cash systems have failed to become widespread.  Instead, credit card
purchases (and systems such as PayPal that are based on credit and
debit card accounts) have become the dominant means of payment
over the Internet.46  Sellers and buyers are subject to the elaborate
rules of the credit card payment system, and so there is relatively little
recourse to national courts.  Credit cards have two decisive consumer
protections compared with e-cash systems.  If there is unauthorized
use of the credit or debit card, the individual’s loss is limited by U.S.
statute, usually to $50.47  In addition, the credit card brings with it an
already-functioning dispute resolution system.  If a merchant claims
43
See supra Part IV.D.
44
Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap:  The Importance of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce and
Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847 (2003).
45
See id. at 850-51 (concluding that “vision of the New Economy” in the mid-1990s
“foretold a future of E-cash, of nimble Internet companies destroying physical retailers,
and an end to intermediaries between sellers and buyers”).
46
See id. at 851-54 (describing the advantages of the debit and credit card payment
systems for online transactions).
47
See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Sys-
tems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996) (analyzing consumer-protection rules applying to unau-
thorized use of credit cards, debit cards, and checks).
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that a customer has spent $200 on software, and the customer dis-
agrees, then the customer is not charged for the $200 while the dis-
pute is in process.48  With these ready-made ways to protect custom-
ers against unauthorized use and to resolve disputes, the credit card
system inspires trust in consumers, creates effective dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, and avoids the need for recourse to national
courts.
Second, the early predictions of “pure play” Internet sellers envi-
sioned that online commerce would take place between one site for
each seller and buyers who might exist anywhere in the world.  Over
time, the major pure Internet sites have gone international, with sepa-
rate sites in markets such as France and Germany.  Thus, those na-
tional sites are likely to be subject to that nation’s laws.49  More
broadly, with time we have seen the rapid growth of “clicks and bricks”
retailers, where the seller has physical locations in addition to web-
sites.50  Having physical stores inspires trust in the solidity of known
brands.  Having physical stores adds value to an online transaction,
because the physical location can provide in-person services such as
exchanges, repairs, and demonstrations about how to use a product.
Of greatest relevance to choice-of-law rules, the existence of a physical
retailer in the jurisdiction makes it overwhelmingly likely that local
consumer laws will apply.  The consumer, in essence, gets insurance
against unfamiliar consumer-protection rules.
The third early prediction about e-commerce was that search en-
gines and the global reach of the Internet would eliminate the need
for wholesalers and other intermediaries.  Consumers can feel that it
is very risky, however, to buy from a website they have never heard of,
in a country far away.  One major cure for this problem has been the
phenomenal growth of auction sites, especially the Internet interme-
diary eBay.  Listings in 2004 reached 1.4 billion, up 45% from 971 mil-
48
For further discussion of the chargeback dispute resolution mechanism in e-
commerce, including ways that protections often apply outside of the United States,
see Lester, supra note 40, at 461-64.
49
Two of the leading “pure play” Internet sites are Amazon.com and Yahoo!.
Both now have separate sites for France and Germany.  See http://www.amazon.fr;
http://www.amazon.de; http://fr.yahoo.com; http://de.yahoo.com.
50
See Swire, supra note 44, at 854-56.  For one analysis of the business and infra-
structure advantages of the approach, see Anne Stuart, Clicks and Bricks, CIO, Mar. 15,
2000, at 76, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/031500/click.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2005).
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lion in 2003.51  An important achievement of eBay is that it has created
a mechanism for matching individual buyers and sellers, even when
they have never transacted with each other before and are in different
countries.  The international reach of eBay is apparent from the front
page of www.ebay.com, which provides targeted pages for twenty-five
different countries.
Although it was likely not a major goal of eBay’s managers to avoid
conflict-of-laws disputes, that has been one effect of the business
model.  Initially, trust on eBay was supposed to result from feedback
ratings that customers gave to each other.  Over time, however, eBay
has created an entire legal system that accompanies each sale.52  The
system contains at least a dozen consumer protections, including
fraud protection for the buyer, an escrow service so that buyers can
examine an item before payment goes to the seller, a verified identity
program, and a system for fraud enforcement including referrals if
necessary for criminal activity.  In essence, buyers and sellers do not
have to trust in mice—the other individuals with whom they transact.
They can trust instead in an elephant, eBay.  Although eBay initially
became famous for small purchases, such as hobbyist collectibles, to-
day’s eBay includes numerous auctions for valuable items such as
diamonds.  Even these large consumer transactions appear to be con-
ducted without recourse to national courts, avoiding judicial pro-
nouncements about which jurisdiction’s laws apply.
Taken together, the winning business models for e-commerce all
have the effect of reducing the number of court cases that choose
which laws to apply.  Credit cards and eBay have become the domi-
nant dispute resolution systems.  “Clicks and bricks” retailers are sub-
ject to local law, making it unlikely that the online seller can seek to
apply the laws of a distant country.  Conflict-of-laws issues do not arise,
even for international sales where the nations have different laws, be-
cause the transactions take place inside structures that avoid the con-
flicts.
51
Press Release, eBay, eBay Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2004
Financial Results 1 (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://investor.ebay.com/releases.cfm?
Year=2005 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
52
eBay, Rules & Safety Overview (SafeHarbor), at http://pages.ebay.com/help/
community/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).  For analysis of these safeguards,
see Swire, supra note 44, at 856-58.
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These business models have successfully facilitated the growth of
e-commerce even after the Internet bubble burst.53  That does not
mean, however, that the current business models and legal rules are
the best ones possible.  Professor Erin O’Hara, in her article in this
Symposium, expresses concern that transaction fees for eBay transac-
tions can exceed ten percent of the value of the sale (although fees
drop below three percent for value over $25).54  Professor Clay Gillette
has critiqued some aspects of the eBay system.55  There may be legal
rules, including choice-of-law rules, that would do an even better job
at inspiring trust and encouraging international e-commerce.  With
that said, however, the recent business models have been accompa-
nied by the spread of e-commerce and avoidance of choice-of-law
cases in the courts.
VI.  WHERE INTERNATIONAL CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
MAY AFFECT INTERNET ACTIVITIES
We are now in a better position to describe when choice-of-law
rules will affect Internet activity.  Such rules will be most important
when three conditions are present:  (i) where there is activity by ele-
phants; (ii) where there has not been harmonization; and (iii) where
the structure of transactions does not prevent the dispute.  The re-
maining international choice-of-law disputes occur in two contexts.
The first is for financial harms suffered by third parties, especially for
intellectual property and tort claims.  The second is for a limited set of
issues that involve significant moral, political, or constitutional differ-
ences.
53
Estimates of the size and growth of e-commerce have varied enormously, due in
part to the lack of standardized definitions of what counts as business-to-consumer and
business-to-business e-commerce.  With that said, one careful survey of the estimates in
2003 concluded that the “value of e-commerce transactions, while still small relative to
the size of the U.S. economy, continues to show strong growth despite a recent eco-
nomic downturn.”  RITA TEHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., E-COMMERCE STATISTICS:
EXPLANATION AND SOURCES 1 (rev. ed. 2003), available at http://www.usembassy.it/
pdf/other/RL31293.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
54
Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions:  The Uneasy Case for On-
line Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1908 & n.85 (2005).
55
See Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA.
L. REV. 1165, 1177-92 (2002) (questioning the efficacy of eBay’s feedback forum as a
contract enforcement tool).
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A.  Financial Harms Suffered by Third Parties
The previous section discussed how Internet transactions can
generally be structured to avoid choice-of-law disputes, for both
business-to-business transactions and business-to-consumer transac-
tions.  There are certain harms, however, that are suffered by parties
who are not subject to the contract.  Harms can exist under property
or tort law.
Physical items do not transfer over the Internet.  The harms to
property that occur in connection with the Internet thus involve intel-
lectual property.  The potential scope of choice-of-law disputes for in-
tellectual property is greatly narrowed by the territorial nature of
much of intellectual property law.  Even today, patent56 and trade-
mark57 law are overwhelmingly understood to apply within each sover-
eign territory, so that a separate patent or trademark must be secured
in each country in which infringement is alleged.
Disputes over domain names have tested this territorial approach.
For domain names, the two parties to the relevant contract are the
current owner of the name and the registrar who provides the name.
Two recent choice-of-law disputes arose when a third party claimed
that the domain name, used worldwide, violated a trademark.  In both
Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com58 and Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Ex-
celentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,59 U.S. courts decided to apply U.S.
law even in the face of numerous foreign contacts.  Professor Paul
Schiff Berman’s article in this Symposium provides extensive analysis
of the two cases, and reaches a normative conclusion:  “[W]e need to
56
For new research underscoring the territorial reach of patent law, and specific
gaps in patent protection that thus result, see Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringe-
ment Claims, 33 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. (forthcoming 2005).
57
For a history and defense of territoriality in trademark law, see Curtis A. Brad-
ley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505
(1997).  For a critique that advocates a limited extraterritorial reach of U.S. trademark
law, see Roger E. Schechter, The Case for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act,
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 619 (1997) (advocating extraterritorial application of trademark law
for a limited set of well-known marks).  See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks
and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law From the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885
(2004) (criticizing exclusively territorial basis of trademark law).
58
250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003) (establishing in rem jurisdiction under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, and applying U.S. law according to the
Princess Lida doctrine).
59
330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the application of United States
trademark law is consistent with the fundamental doctrine of territoriality).
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reconsider the traditional assumption that trademark disputes must
always be resolved by applying the law of the forum country.”60
For purposes of this paper, which addresses the descriptive ques-
tion of when choice-of-law disputes arise from the Internet, the point
is to show why this category of case gives rise to choice-of-law prob-
lems.  The substantial financial stakes in ownership of a domain name,
and the fact that harms can fall on third parties, gives those third par-
ties an incentive to bring the case that results in a choice-of-law judg-
ment.  If and only if the territorial tradition of trademark law becomes
weaker, then we may see a significant number of trademark court de-
cisions delineating which nation’s laws should apply.61
Although the territorial tradition of trademark and patent laws
thus remains strong, the current approach for copyright is different.
As described by Professor Justin Hughes, there has been significant
harmonization of copyright laws.62  Where this harmonization exists,
choice-of-law disputes are minimized because the same substantive
rule applies under the law of the various jurisdictions.  The remaining
disputes occur in situations where harmonization has not been
achieved.  A prominent example of lack of harmonization occurred in
the case of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV.63  In that case,
streaming of video material by a Canadian company to Canadian resi-
dents was lawful in Canada.  The film studio, however, succeeded in
getting an injunction under U.S. law, due to access to the content by
some U.S. users.  The principal source of choice-of-law judicial deci-
sions for copyright issues, therefore, would seem likely to occur for
specific situations where harmonization has not taken place.  These
situations may individually be very important, but it conceptually
makes sense to think of them as a relatively finite number of particular
60
Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:  Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1834 (2005).
61
The number of conflicts for domain names is also reduced by the alternative
dispute resolution mechanism of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Pro-
gram (UDRP), established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN).  The rules for that program are set forth at http://www.icann.org/
dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm.  For comprehensive commentary and citations con-
cerning ICANN and the UDRP, see the site created by Professor A. Michael Froomkin,
http://www.icannwatch.org.
62
See Hughes, supra note 21, at 363 (noting that the 1996 World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization copyright treaties are “a successful example of top-down conver-
gence”).
63
Nos. Civ.A. 00-120, Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
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conflicts, rather than a potentially limitless universe of potential con-
flicts that arise from the global nature of the Internet.64
In addition to contract-based claims (largely avoided by the struc-
ture of transactions) and property-based claims (largely avoided by
territoriality and harmonization), there can be tort-based claims that
arise from Internet conduct.  The most prominent Internet-based tort
to date is defamation.  The tort of defamation has been a fertile
source of choice-of-laws cases in the United States.65  The leading edge
of potential Internet defamation cases is Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co.66
In that case, the High Court of Australia permitted a defamation ac-
tion by an Australian to proceed based on publication over the Inter-
net by a U.S. company using a U.S.-based server.  The number of
defamation disputes could climb substantially if any major jurisdiction
became noticeably favorable to plaintiffs in awarding judgments.  Pub-
lishers on the Internet might seek to prevent their statements from
reaching that jurisdiction, but it would be difficult for such limits to
succeed.
Other tortious harms to third parties might become more promi-
nent in the future.  Intentional attacks on a computer system are
treated as crimes in a growing number of countries, as discussed above
in connection with the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention.67
Tort actions, such as trespass to chattels, may then be pursued in the
relatively limited subset of cases where the attacker is identified and
has enough assets to be worth pursuing.68  A potentially important
type of claim in the future may be a claim that a software producer or
system owner provided tortiously weak computer security, such as fail-
ure to fix a known vulnerability.69  For these and other torts, choice-of-
64
For a detailed analysis of international conflict-of-laws issues in copyright, see
Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases:  Infringement and Ownership Is-
sues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315 (2004).
65
Prominent examples include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(applying the First Amendment to prevent application of an Alabama defamation
claim), and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (permitting a California defamation
claim to proceed against Florida persons).
66
(2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
67
See supra Part IV.A.
68
For a recent article collecting sources, see Daniel Kearney, Note, Network Effects
and the Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2005).
69
There has been a paucity to date of scholarship on how the tort system should
assess claims for weak computer security.  There are intricate legal issues that deserve
fuller attention, including the application of the tort system to purely economic losses
and the question of how (and whether) to levy damages for harms that are highly net-
worked and affect a potentially enormous number of people.  For one article that col-
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law decisions thus might be made in the courts when at least one ju-
risdiction permits plaintiffs to win on such claims, and there are iden-
tified defendants who have significant assets.
In terms of quantity of choice-of-law cases, there are specific intel-
lectual property and tort situations where third parties might seek
court resolution of issues arising from the Internet.  The most likely
categories thus far for court decisions include:  areas where trademark
or patent law depart from the territorial tradition; areas of copyright
law that have not been harmonized; defamation; and other torts if at
least one jurisdiction adopts plaintiff-friendly rules for liability.
B.  Issues Involving Significant Moral, Political,
or Constitutional Differences
The remaining category of potential choice-of-law cases is more
elusive to define.  The suggestion here is that there is a fairly limited
number of disputes concerning the Internet where nations have sig-
nificant moral, political, or constitutional differences.  To date, the
bulk of these disputes have involved the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.  The structure of the disputes is that the First Amend-
ment protects publication within the United States of material that is
unlawful in another country.
The most famous recent example is Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme.70  French law prohibits the display of Nazi
paraphernalia, but the First Amendment protects a speaker’s right to
display it.  The corporation Yahoo!-France had to comply with French
law, but the separate corporation Yahoo!, Inc., operating in the
United States, was held in U.S. court not to have to satisfy the French
judgment against it.
Similar First Amendment conflicts can exist for topics other than
hate speech.  In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,71 the U.S. Su-
preme Court struck down a federal anti-pornography statute, holding
that First Amendment speech protections apply to Internet content.
There are several concerns regarding the effect of this decision.  For
lects sources, see Kevin R. Pinkney, Putting Blame Where Blame Is Due:  Software Manufac-
turer and Customer Liability for Security-Related Software Failure, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
43 (2002).
70
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted en banc, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005).  The underlying
French judgment is T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/
txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
71
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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example, anti-pornography laws in other countries may thus be unen-
forceable against U.S. websites.  In the area of political speech, nations
including China and Singapore may seek to censor critics of their re-
spective governments.  Once again, however, the First Amendment
would likely shield persons in the United States who make those criti-
cisms.  Electronic Frontier Foundation cofounder John Perry Barlow
is credited with the aphorism that “[i]n Cyberspace, the First
Amendment is a local ordinance.”72  As just a “local ordinance,” the
First Amendment is a fertile source for potential conflicts with other
ordinances.  To the frustration of other countries who wish to enforce
their laws, however, this ordinance is written into the U.S. Constitu-
tion and thus is highly resistant to change.
Clashes of moral values exist outside of the First Amendment
realm.  One current example concerns the legality of U.S. laws ban-
ning Internet gambling.  A panel of the World Trade Organization
has upheld the complaint of Antigua and Barbuda against the United
States for the latter’s ban on Internet gambling.73  The case represents
the first time that the WTO has ruled on the scope of the “public
morals” exception to obligations to permit free trade in services.74
The United States has announced that it will appeal the panel ruling,
arguing among other points that cross-border gambling was never in-
cluded within the scope of international free trade obligations.75
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CONCLUSION
A chief task of this Article has been to treat international choice of
law on the Internet as a dependent variable, and to explain the condi-
tions under which such cases arise.  A second task, addressed briefly
here, is to consider the existence of mice as a dependent variable; that
is, what measures can affect the prevalence of mice, and thus the per-
sistence of actors on the Internet who can act outside of the law.
A.  Summary on the Frequency and Type
of Choice-of-Law Cases
The prominence of the Yahoo! and Internet gambling cases is not
matched by their frequency.  There is a limited subset of important
clashes of moral, political, or constitutional values.  The Internet
heightens the conflict between nations because individual citizens can
so easily “cross” borders to interact with websites in other countries.
Despite the importance of such clashes, the number of choice-of-
law cases arising from the Internet is far less than is suggested by the
image of each surfer potentially having an international dispute with
each website.  As a descriptive matter, two filters are especially effec-
tive in reducing the number of choice-of-law cases from the poten-
tially infinite down to a handful—only elephants pay much attention
to choice-of-law issues, and successful business models on the web are
effective at avoiding choice-of-law disputes.  Two other filters also
could reduce the number of disputes.  Jurisdictional limitations could
do so, but sellers on the Internet will come under the jurisdiction of
the buyer’s country in almost all settings.  Harmonization can also re-
duce conflicts, but only limited harmonization has been implemented
at the global level.
The analysis here also suggests a hitherto undescribed category as
the area where the number of choice-of-law cases could become nu-
merous—claims brought by third parties that involve substantial po-
tential damages.  Defamation claims and disputes over the scope of
intellectual property rights are the chief candidates for such claims.
B.  Surveillance as a Way to Try to Stop the Mice
To this point, this Article has treated the prevalence of mice as a
given.  As discussed in the 1998 article, however, there are strategies
2000 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1975
for nations that wish to address the perceived harms caused by mice.76
Nations can focus their attention on alternative targets of enforce-
ment, including the payments system, Internet Service Providers, and
other gatekeepers such as Yahoo! through whom the bits flow between
the mouse (creator of the harm) and the user.  Nations can also seek
to apply pressure to the other countries that serve as safe dens for the
mice.  Finally, the users themselves, such as those who download mu-
sic or pornography, might be the target of enforcement.
All of these strategies could reduce current illegal activity, and all
have been used to some extent.  One general theme that was not de-
veloped in the 1998 article, however, is the possibility that increased
surveillance could be a general-purpose tool for increasing the en-
forceability of law on the Internet.  “Data retention” rules might be
imposed on Internet Service Providers so that the providers would re-
tain records of where their customers surfed on the web.  Stronger
authentication could become a precondition for sending emails or
doing other web activity.  Most generally, there are temptations in the
post-9/11 world to minimize anonymity and increase traceability for
essentially all web activity.  In addition, many Internet users are espe-
cially irritated by spam, and would welcome a revised Internet that ef-
fectively tracks spammers back to their nests.
This Article will not attempt to set forth a general theory of when
increased surveillance over the Internet is desirable.  Many of my pre-
vious writings have addressed aspects of that broader inquiry.77  The
point here, instead, is to highlight that the degree to which mice exist
is contingent upon the technological and legal choices we will make
in the coming years.  A determined enough effort can greatly reduce
the number of mice.  To extend the metaphor, we can put out poi-
soned cheese and take other strong measures to attack the mice.  But
the same poison might also kill our house pets and have other bad
consequences.  The desire to increase surveillance and hunt down the
76
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mice must be balanced by thoughtful inquiry about the many other
consequences of such actions.
